Reconsidering the. Robustness of. Authoritarianism in the Middle East. Lessons from the Arab Spring. Eva Bellin. Valeriia Gladkaia, učo Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East: Lessons Author Eva Bellin; Book or Journal Comparative Politics; Vol. ROA is still valid in explaining the Arab Spring. “the coercive apparatus capacity and will + the level of political mobilization are decisive”.
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Recconsidering and Looking Ahead On a final note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi.
The Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Middle East : Exceptionalism in Comparative Perspective
Between Domestic and External Challenges. In the past, the military always kept its historic forced subordination reconsiderihg relation to the Ministry when making decisions—the Interior forces saw the relationship as favorable. Setting a reading intention helps you bllin your reading. In fact, coup-proofing literature establishes that Arab regimes deliberately and uniquely constructed parallel militaries to counterweight the regular armed forces, which they saw as sources of potential coups.
Comparative Politics Januarypp. You can filter on reading intentions from the listas well as view them within your profile.
Skip to search form Skip to gobustness content. Papers received outside of official solicitation bellun will be marked for consideration in the next issue for which they are eligible. The Relationship between the Military and Internal Security Agencies First, we will consider the clash of interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations.
The fundamental principle behind this paper is to reject the impression of a homogenous security apparatus. We can also consider the independent institutional relationships with the public. Among these, the crucial ones were internal cohesion in relation to the masses and post-revolt survival in relation to the regime. High CapacityLow Dobustness YIRA members automatically receive the update. Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen: To add insights to the currently lacking literature on defection and coercive apparatus disaggregation, the paper suggests the following areas for research:.
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Abandoned at the palace: To summarize, the army elites—already frustrated by a legacy of disagreement with the regime and Ministry structure—also realized that their subordinates could feasibly defect because of the culture of dealing with the public.
In fact, common arguments like empathy with the protesting masses or political grievances against the regime could apply to riot police as ega as soldiers in tanks. Hence, by substantially varying the conditions under which security forces chose to repress, sectarian cases disable comparison with cases like Egypt and Tunisia.
Accessed March 13, Your reading intentions are private to you and will not be shown to other users. Sectarianism and coup-proofing strategies in bahrain.
Please log in to set a read status. In fact, the affair explains the anomalous 9. To set a reading intention, click through to any list item, and look for the panel on the left hand side:. First, we will consider the clash redonsidering interests between the army and the Interior Ministry to illustrate how a legacy of distrust split the military and internal organizations.
How do I set a reading intention To set a reading intention, click through to any list item, and look for the panel on the left hand side: It has already been established that the agency-army tussle over the years disenchanted the military but actually wooed and benefited the security forces.
Moreover, in political terms, just like the Tunisian military, as the most trusted public institution, the Egyptian forces expected a forthcoming role as the arbiter of the revolution—they would direct their own economic fate.
On a final note, it is evident that the coercive apparatus in the two countries where the Arab Spring caused perhaps the most rupture was not only internally heterogeneous in structure but also in strategic interests and decision-making calculi.
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Reconsidering the Robustness of Authoritarianism in the Midd by Magdolin Harmina on Prezi
Violent crackdown had few precedents, and public admiration meant defection could seem attractive. In ways, defection was a zero-sum game—the losses involved in sticking with the Ministry relative to reconsiderijg risks of defection losing the already meager economic livelihood and potential rejection and outrage were less.
On one hand, the Interior Ministry was inextricably tied to the regime. In Tunisia, police officers worked more than 12 hours a day, earning less than the wages of bus driver.